Server definition
- Hash
- sha256:95c07c476c42053ad7b140793d84dea525ab1b57073ed62a14a2d4489802817a
- What it is
- What a remote MCP server returned when asked what it offers: 18 tools
The blob, as servednamed by its sha256
{
"instructions": "DCL Trust Oracle is a deterministic AI audit layer, natively integrated with the Model Context Protocol (MCP), that evaluates LLM and agent outputs against configurable policies before and after action. Every verdict is written to a tamper-evident, hash-chained audit log that stores only cryptographic metadata — never raw content — enabling privacy-first, post-action forensic review. The server exposes Jailbreak detection (instruction adherence checks), Quality and drift evaluation, and baseline Safety checks alongside fast and strict pre-action audit tiers. Tool calls are metered and settled via the x402 micropayment protocol (USDC on Base), letting autonomous agents pay per-call without any account setup. Use these tools to gate risky agent actions, batch-evaluate responses, and cryptographically verify the integrity of past decisions.",
"tools": [
{
"description": "POST-ACTION Basic Audit ($0.10). Retrieves a record from the tamper-evident chain by tx_hash.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Transaction hash of the audit chain record to retrieve.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"tx_hash"
],
"title": "dcl_audit_decodeArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_audit_decode",
"outputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Identifier of the agent tied to this record.",
"title": "Agent Id"
},
"chain_index": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "integer"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Sequential index of the record in the chain.",
"title": "Chain Index"
},
"chain_integrity": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "boolean"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "True if the full chain verifies as intact.",
"title": "Chain Integrity"
},
"confidence": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "number"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Confidence score recorded for the verdict.",
"title": "Confidence"
},
"error": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Set if tx_hash was not found; other fields are omitted.",
"title": "Error"
},
"prev_hash": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Hash of the preceding record in the chain.",
"title": "Prev Hash"
},
"reason": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Explanation recorded for the verdict.",
"title": "Reason"
},
"seal_text": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
"title": "Seal Text"
},
"task_type": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Task type tag recorded with this entry.",
"title": "Task Type"
},
"timestamp": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "number"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Unix timestamp when the record was created.",
"title": "Timestamp"
},
"tx_hash": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Hash of the audit chain record.",
"title": "Tx Hash"
},
"verdict": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "COMMIT or NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict"
},
"verify_url": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
"title": "Verify Url"
}
},
"title": "AuditResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "POST-ACTION Deep Forensic Audit ($0.50). Extended output with drift_context and full chain integrity verification.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Transaction hash of the audit chain record to retrieve.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"tx_hash"
],
"title": "dcl_audit_decode_deepArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_audit_decode_deep",
"outputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Identifier of the agent tied to this record.",
"title": "Agent Id"
},
"chain_index": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "integer"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Sequential index of the record in the chain.",
"title": "Chain Index"
},
"chain_integrity": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "boolean"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "True if the full chain verifies as intact.",
"title": "Chain Integrity"
},
"confidence": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "number"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Confidence score recorded for the verdict.",
"title": "Confidence"
},
"drift_context": {
"anyOf": [
{
"additionalProperties": true,
"type": "object"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Extended forensic metadata captured at evaluation time.",
"title": "Drift Context"
},
"error": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Set if tx_hash was not found; other fields are omitted.",
"title": "Error"
},
"prev_hash": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Hash of the preceding record in the chain.",
"title": "Prev Hash"
},
"reason": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Explanation recorded for the verdict.",
"title": "Reason"
},
"seal_text": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
"title": "Seal Text"
},
"tamper_reason": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Why chain_integrity is False — a broken prev_hash link or an edited row whose stored tx_hash no longer matches its recomputed content hash.",
"title": "Tamper Reason"
},
"tampered_at_index": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "integer"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Index where chain integrity broke, if any tampering was detected.",
"title": "Tampered At Index"
},
"task_type": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Task type tag recorded with this entry.",
"title": "Task Type"
},
"timestamp": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "number"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Unix timestamp when the record was created.",
"title": "Timestamp"
},
"tx_hash": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Hash of the audit chain record.",
"title": "Tx Hash"
},
"verdict": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "COMMIT or NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict"
},
"verify_url": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
"title": "Verify Url"
}
},
"title": "AuditDeepResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "FINAL-STEP Leibniz Layer Crypto Commit ($0.01). Writes a trading/agent decision to the append-only Leibniz Layer audit chain and returns a Merkle-proof-style receipt: `tx_hash` (proof of this specific commit), `chain_hash` (the previous commit's hash, linking this one into the chain), and `chain_depth` (this commit's position in the chain). Unlike the evaluate_* tools, this call has no pass/fail verdict of its own — it always succeeds and simply seals the decision. Passing `prior_checks` is optional but recommended: it records which earlier pipeline steps (firewall/wallet/trade/MEV) this specific commit is downstream of, in one auditable record. Always run this LAST, after every other crypto-suite check has passed.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent whose decision is being committed.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"decision": {
"description": "The final trading/agent decision text to commit to the audit chain.",
"title": "Decision",
"type": "string"
},
"prior_checks": {
"anyOf": [
{
"additionalProperties": true,
"type": "object"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Optional dict of tx_hashes from earlier pipeline steps (e.g. {'prompt_firewall_tx_hash': ..., 'trade_verifier_tx_hash': ..., 'mev_compliance_tx_hash': ...}), linking this commit to the specific checks that passed before it.",
"title": "Prior Checks"
}
},
"required": [
"decision",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_commitArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_commit",
"outputSchema": {
"properties": {
"chain_depth": {
"description": "This commit's position (index) in the chain.",
"title": "Chain Depth",
"type": "integer"
},
"chain_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the previous commit in the append-only chain that this one links to.",
"title": "Chain Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the committed decision text (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"timestamp": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
"title": "Timestamp",
"type": "number"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Tamper-evident proof of this specific commit.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"tx_hash",
"chain_hash",
"chain_depth",
"input_hash",
"timestamp"
],
"title": "CommitResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "PRE-ACTION Bulk Processing ($0.10). Evaluates a list of items in one call; each item is a dict shaped {\"response\": str, \"policy\"?: str}, where policy defaults to \"default\" if omitted and may be any built-in policy name (default, strict, anti_jailbreak, safety, content_quality). Each item gets its own independent COMMIT/NO_COMMIT verdict via the same logic as the matching single-item evaluate_* tool; results are returned in input order under `results`, plus a shared `batch_id`. Capped at 200 items per call — oversized batches are rejected. Use this instead of multiple single-item evaluate_* calls when checking several responses — optionally against different policies — in one priced call rather than paying per item separately.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the responses.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"items": {
"description": "List of items to evaluate, each shaped like {'response': str, 'policy'?: str}.",
"items": {
"additionalProperties": true,
"type": "object"
},
"title": "Items",
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
"items",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_evaluate_batchArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_evaluate_batch",
"outputSchema": {
"$defs": {
"EvaluateResult": {
"properties": {
"chain_index": {
"description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
"title": "Chain Index",
"type": "integer"
},
"confidence": {
"description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
"title": "Confidence",
"type": "number"
},
"drift_mode": {
"description": "Current drift status: NORMAL, WARNING, ESCALATION, or BLOCK.",
"title": "Drift Mode",
"type": "string"
},
"drift_score": {
"description": "Z-score measuring deviation of the recent commit rate from baseline.",
"title": "Drift Score",
"type": "number"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the evaluated response (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"policy_version": {
"description": "Version of the policy that was applied.",
"title": "Policy Version",
"type": "string"
},
"reason": {
"description": "Human-readable explanation of why the verdict was reached.",
"title": "Reason",
"type": "string"
},
"seal_text": {
"description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
"title": "Seal Text",
"type": "string"
},
"timestamp": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
"title": "Timestamp",
"type": "number"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"verdict": {
"description": "COMMIT if the response passed policy checks, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict",
"type": "string"
},
"verify_url": {
"description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
"title": "Verify Url",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"verdict",
"confidence",
"reason",
"tx_hash",
"chain_index",
"input_hash",
"policy_version",
"drift_mode",
"drift_score",
"timestamp",
"seal_text",
"verify_url"
],
"title": "EvaluateResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent whose responses were evaluated.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"batch_id": {
"description": "Unique identifier for this batch run.",
"title": "Batch Id",
"type": "string"
},
"count": {
"description": "Number of items evaluated in this batch.",
"title": "Count",
"type": "integer"
},
"results": {
"description": "Per-item evaluation results, in input order.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/EvaluateResult"
},
"title": "Results",
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
"batch_id",
"agent_id",
"count",
"results"
],
"title": "BatchResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "FAST Pre-Action Audit ($0.01). Runs the response through the server's \"default\" policy: a substring check against 3 forbidden phrases (\"ignore previous instructions\", \"jailbreak\", \"bypass safety\") with a 0.7 minimum-confidence threshold. Each forbidden match found costs 0.4 confidence; if confidence falls below 0.7, or any match is found, the verdict is NO_COMMIT and `reason` lists which phrase triggered it. Otherwise COMMIT. Use this as the default low-cost first-pass gate before a risky agent action; switch to dcl_evaluate_strict for a broader, higher-bar check, or to dcl_evaluate_jailbreak / dcl_evaluate_safety / dcl_evaluate_quality for a narrower, single-topic check instead of the general-purpose default policy.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"response": {
"description": "The agent or LLM response text to audit.",
"title": "Response",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"response",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_evaluate_fastArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_evaluate_fast",
"outputSchema": {
"properties": {
"chain_index": {
"description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
"title": "Chain Index",
"type": "integer"
},
"confidence": {
"description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
"title": "Confidence",
"type": "number"
},
"drift_mode": {
"description": "Current drift status: NORMAL, WARNING, ESCALATION, or BLOCK.",
"title": "Drift Mode",
"type": "string"
},
"drift_score": {
"description": "Z-score measuring deviation of the recent commit rate from baseline.",
"title": "Drift Score",
"type": "number"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the evaluated response (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"policy_version": {
"description": "Version of the policy that was applied.",
"title": "Policy Version",
"type": "string"
},
"reason": {
"description": "Human-readable explanation of why the verdict was reached.",
"title": "Reason",
"type": "string"
},
"seal_text": {
"description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
"title": "Seal Text",
"type": "string"
},
"timestamp": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
"title": "Timestamp",
"type": "number"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"verdict": {
"description": "COMMIT if the response passed policy checks, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict",
"type": "string"
},
"verify_url": {
"description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
"title": "Verify Url",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"verdict",
"confidence",
"reason",
"tx_hash",
"chain_index",
"input_hash",
"policy_version",
"drift_mode",
"drift_score",
"timestamp",
"seal_text",
"verify_url"
],
"title": "EvaluateResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "PRE-ACTION Instruction Adherence Check ($0.02). Runs the \"anti_jailbreak\" policy: a substring check against 6 forbidden phrases (\"ignore previous instructions\", \"jailbreak\", \"bypass safety\", \"pretend you are\", \"act as if\", \"DAN\") with a 0.8 minimum-confidence threshold — each match costs 0.4 confidence. Returns COMMIT if no phrase matches and confidence stays at or above 0.8, otherwise NO_COMMIT with `reason` listing the matched phrase(s). Use this as a targeted, cheaper check when the concern is specifically prompt-injection / persona-hijack risk; use dcl_evaluate_strict instead when you also want safety- and default-policy phrases covered in the same call.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"response": {
"description": "The agent or LLM response text to check for jailbreak attempts.",
"title": "Response",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"response",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_evaluate_jailbreakArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_evaluate_jailbreak",
"outputSchema": {
"properties": {
"chain_index": {
"description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
"title": "Chain Index",
"type": "integer"
},
"confidence": {
"description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
"title": "Confidence",
"type": "number"
},
"drift_mode": {
"description": "Current drift status: NORMAL, WARNING, ESCALATION, or BLOCK.",
"title": "Drift Mode",
"type": "string"
},
"drift_score": {
"description": "Z-score measuring deviation of the recent commit rate from baseline.",
"title": "Drift Score",
"type": "number"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the evaluated response (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"policy_version": {
"description": "Version of the policy that was applied.",
"title": "Policy Version",
"type": "string"
},
"reason": {
"description": "Human-readable explanation of why the verdict was reached.",
"title": "Reason",
"type": "string"
},
"seal_text": {
"description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
"title": "Seal Text",
"type": "string"
},
"timestamp": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
"title": "Timestamp",
"type": "number"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"verdict": {
"description": "COMMIT if the response passed policy checks, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict",
"type": "string"
},
"verify_url": {
"description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
"title": "Verify Url",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"verdict",
"confidence",
"reason",
"tx_hash",
"chain_index",
"input_hash",
"policy_version",
"drift_mode",
"drift_score",
"timestamp",
"seal_text",
"verify_url"
],
"title": "EvaluateResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "PRE-ACTION Crypto Jailbreak & Injection Detection ($0.02). Crypto-specialized instruction-override/jailbreak/injection screen: standard role-switch and instruction-override patterns, plus crypto-specific drain-wallet injection (e.g. \"transfer all funds to...\", fake \"test transaction\" requesting full balance) and unlimited-approval injection (e.g. type(uint256).max, \"approve unlimited allowance\", skip-slippage-confirmation framing). Any match returns NO_COMMIT with `reason` and `findings` naming the matched category/categories; run this FIRST in the DCL crypto pipeline, before wallet/trade/MEV checks, since it screens the input itself rather than a decision built on top of it.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that produced or received the text.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"response": {
"description": "The incoming prompt or agent response to screen for crypto-specialized jailbreak/injection attempts.",
"title": "Response",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"response",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_evaluate_jailbreak_cryptoArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_evaluate_jailbreak_crypto",
"outputSchema": {
"$defs": {
"CryptoFinding": {
"properties": {
"regulatory_reference": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Illustrative regulatory tag for this finding type (e.g. MiFID II, FCA), if applicable.",
"title": "Regulatory Reference"
},
"severity": {
"description": "critical or major.",
"title": "Severity",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"description": "The specific pattern category matched.",
"title": "Type",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"severity"
],
"title": "CryptoFinding",
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"chain_index": {
"description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
"title": "Chain Index",
"type": "integer"
},
"confidence": {
"description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
"title": "Confidence",
"type": "number"
},
"findings": {
"description": "All matched patterns. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CryptoFinding"
},
"title": "Findings",
"type": "array"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the screened text (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"policy_version": {
"description": "Version of the crypto jailbreak policy that was applied.",
"title": "Policy Version",
"type": "string"
},
"reason": {
"description": "Human-readable explanation of the verdict.",
"title": "Reason",
"type": "string"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"verdict": {
"description": "COMMIT if no injection pattern matched, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"verdict",
"confidence",
"reason",
"findings",
"tx_hash",
"chain_index",
"input_hash",
"policy_version"
],
"title": "JailbreakCryptoResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "POST-ACTION MEV & Market-Abuse Compliance Screen ($0.03). Text-level screen (not a mempool/transaction analyzer) for front-running/sandwich-attack language, wash trading/layering/spoofing, KYC/AML red flags (mixers, structuring, obscuring fund origin), and pump-and-dump/rug-pull language. Any critical-severity finding, or two or more major-severity findings, returns NO_COMMIT; a single major-severity finding is also returned as NO_COMMIT but with a distinctly higher `confidence` (~0.55 vs ~0.05-0.2 for harder violations) so downstream callers can tell a soft single flag apart from a hard multi-finding block. Each finding includes an illustrative `regulatory_reference` tag (MiFID II, FCA, or an EU AI Act article).",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"response": {
"description": "The agent or LLM response text describing or proposing an on-chain/trading action, to screen for MEV and market-abuse language.",
"title": "Response",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"response",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_evaluate_mevArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_evaluate_mev",
"outputSchema": {
"$defs": {
"CryptoFinding": {
"properties": {
"regulatory_reference": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Illustrative regulatory tag for this finding type (e.g. MiFID II, FCA), if applicable.",
"title": "Regulatory Reference"
},
"severity": {
"description": "critical or major.",
"title": "Severity",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"description": "The specific pattern category matched.",
"title": "Type",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"severity"
],
"title": "CryptoFinding",
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"chain_index": {
"description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
"title": "Chain Index",
"type": "integer"
},
"confidence": {
"description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
"title": "Confidence",
"type": "number"
},
"findings": {
"description": "All matched patterns. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CryptoFinding"
},
"title": "Findings",
"type": "array"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the screened text (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"timestamp": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
"title": "Timestamp",
"type": "number"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"verdict": {
"description": "COMMIT if the response passed the MEV/compliance screen, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"verdict",
"confidence",
"findings",
"tx_hash",
"chain_index",
"input_hash",
"timestamp"
],
"title": "MevResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "FINAL-GATE Output Sanitizer ($0.02). Post-processing checkpoint that strips secrets/credentials, PII, crypto material (seed phrases, private keys, wallet addresses), internal network details (private IPs, MAC addresses, .internal/.local/.corp hostnames), and unsafe shell/SQL/path-traversal fragments from a raw model response — plus a narrow, high-precision safety net for direct self-harm-instruction-seeking and targeted-harassment phrasing (not a general toxicity classifier). Returns a single `sanitized_output` with every match replaced by `[REDACTED]`; use that instead of the original whenever verdict is NO_COMMIT. Run this as the LAST gate before a response reaches its destination — after `dcl_evaluate_jailbreak_crypto`/other input-side checks have already run, and immediately before `dcl_commit` seals the final decision. Internally re-uses the same detection tables as `dcl_evaluate_secrets`/`dcl_evaluate_pii` for the secrets/PII categories, so results stay consistent with those tools.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"response": {
"description": "The raw LLM/agent response to sanitize before it is delivered to a user, downstream agent, or external system.",
"title": "Response",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"response",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_evaluate_output_sanitizerArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_evaluate_output_sanitizer",
"outputSchema": {
"$defs": {
"SanitizerFinding": {
"properties": {
"category": {
"description": "secrets, pii, crypto, network, toxic, or unsafe_instructions.",
"title": "Category",
"type": "string"
},
"position": {
"description": "Character offset of the match in the submitted text.",
"title": "Position",
"type": "integer"
},
"redacted_sample": {
"description": "Masked version of the match — never the real value.",
"title": "Redacted Sample",
"type": "string"
},
"severity": {
"description": "critical, major, or minor.",
"title": "Severity",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"description": "e.g. api_key, email, seed_phrase, internal_ip, mac_address, internal_hostname, self_harm_instruction, targeted_harassment, shell_injection, sql_injection, path_traversal, and others.",
"title": "Type",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"position",
"redacted_sample",
"severity",
"category"
],
"title": "SanitizerFinding",
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"chain_index": {
"description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
"title": "Chain Index",
"type": "integer"
},
"confidence": {
"description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
"title": "Confidence",
"type": "number"
},
"findings": {
"description": "All matches found, with position/severity/category detail. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/SanitizerFinding"
},
"title": "Findings",
"type": "array"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the sanitized text (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"redaction_count": {
"description": "Total number of items redacted.",
"title": "Redaction Count",
"type": "integer"
},
"risk_score": {
"description": "0.0-1.0 composite severity score.",
"title": "Risk Score",
"type": "number"
},
"sanitized_output": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Input text with every match replaced by [REDACTED]. Null if verdict is COMMIT.",
"title": "Sanitized Output"
},
"timestamp": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
"title": "Timestamp",
"type": "number"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"verdict": {
"description": "COMMIT if the response was clean, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict",
"type": "string"
},
"violations": {
"description": "Distinct finding types matched (e.g. ['api_key', 'internal_ip']). Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"title": "Violations",
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
"verdict",
"confidence",
"violations",
"findings",
"redaction_count",
"risk_score",
"tx_hash",
"chain_index",
"input_hash",
"timestamp"
],
"title": "OutputSanitizerResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "POST-ACTION PII Detection Scan ($0.02). Regex-based scan across 8 personal-data categories, with a Luhn checksum on card numbers to reduce false positives. Any finding results in NO_COMMIT.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"response": {
"description": "The text to scan for personal data: emails, phone numbers, national IDs, bank cards, IBANs, crypto addresses, IP addresses, passport numbers.",
"title": "Response",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"response",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_evaluate_piiArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_evaluate_pii",
"outputSchema": {
"$defs": {
"DetectionFinding": {
"properties": {
"category": {
"description": "Checklist code, e.g. S1-S8 for secrets or T1-T8 for PII.",
"title": "Category",
"type": "string"
},
"position": {
"description": "Character offset of the match in the submitted text.",
"title": "Position",
"type": "integer"
},
"provider": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Identified provider/service, if known.",
"title": "Provider"
},
"redacted_sample": {
"description": "Masked version of the match — first 2 and last 4 chars only.",
"title": "Redacted Sample",
"type": "string"
},
"severity": {
"description": "critical, major, or minor.",
"title": "Severity",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"description": "The specific pattern category matched (e.g. 'api_key', 'email').",
"title": "Type",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"position",
"redacted_sample",
"severity",
"category"
],
"title": "DetectionFinding",
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"categories_checked": {
"description": "All checklist categories that were scanned.",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"title": "Categories Checked",
"type": "array"
},
"categories_clear": {
"description": "Categories with no findings.",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"title": "Categories Clear",
"type": "array"
},
"chain_index": {
"description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
"title": "Chain Index",
"type": "integer"
},
"detection_count": {
"description": "Number of findings.",
"title": "Detection Count",
"type": "integer"
},
"findings": {
"description": "All matches found. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/DetectionFinding"
},
"title": "Findings",
"type": "array"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the scanned text (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"risk_score": {
"description": "0.0-1.0 risk score based on number and severity of findings.",
"title": "Risk Score",
"type": "number"
},
"seal_text": {
"description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
"title": "Seal Text",
"type": "string"
},
"timestamp": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
"title": "Timestamp",
"type": "number"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"verdict": {
"description": "COMMIT if nothing was found, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict",
"type": "string"
},
"verify_url": {
"description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
"title": "Verify Url",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"verdict",
"risk_score",
"findings",
"detection_count",
"categories_checked",
"categories_clear",
"tx_hash",
"chain_index",
"input_hash",
"timestamp",
"seal_text",
"verify_url"
],
"title": "ScanResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "PRE-ACTION Content Quality & Drift Check ($0.03). Runs the \"content_quality\" policy: flags 12 absolutist or unverifiable-claim phrases (e.g. \"guaranteed returns\", \"100% accurate\", \"studies show\", \"without a doubt\") with a 0.85 minimum-confidence threshold — the highest bar of any single-policy tool. Returns NO_COMMIT if any phrase matches or confidence falls below 0.85, with `reason` listing the matched phrase(s). Use this to catch overconfident or unsubstantiated claims in generated content — a different concern from jailbreak or safety phrasing — e.g. before publishing agent-written copy or reports.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"response": {
"description": "The agent or LLM response text to check for quality and drift.",
"title": "Response",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"response",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_evaluate_qualityArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_evaluate_quality",
"outputSchema": {
"properties": {
"chain_index": {
"description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
"title": "Chain Index",
"type": "integer"
},
"confidence": {
"description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
"title": "Confidence",
"type": "number"
},
"drift_mode": {
"description": "Current drift status: NORMAL, WARNING, ESCALATION, or BLOCK.",
"title": "Drift Mode",
"type": "string"
},
"drift_score": {
"description": "Z-score measuring deviation of the recent commit rate from baseline.",
"title": "Drift Score",
"type": "number"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the evaluated response (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"policy_version": {
"description": "Version of the policy that was applied.",
"title": "Policy Version",
"type": "string"
},
"reason": {
"description": "Human-readable explanation of why the verdict was reached.",
"title": "Reason",
"type": "string"
},
"seal_text": {
"description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
"title": "Seal Text",
"type": "string"
},
"timestamp": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
"title": "Timestamp",
"type": "number"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"verdict": {
"description": "COMMIT if the response passed policy checks, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict",
"type": "string"
},
"verify_url": {
"description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
"title": "Verify Url",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"verdict",
"confidence",
"reason",
"tx_hash",
"chain_index",
"input_hash",
"policy_version",
"drift_mode",
"drift_score",
"timestamp",
"seal_text",
"verify_url"
],
"title": "EvaluateResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "PRE-ACTION Baseline Safety Check ($0.01). Runs the \"safety\" policy: flags 2 forbidden disclaimers (\"I cannot be held responsible\", \"no guarantees\") and additionally REQUIRES the substring \"AI\" to appear somewhere in the response — missing it costs 0.2 confidence even with no forbidden phrase present. Minimum confidence is 0.75. Returns NO_COMMIT if confidence drops below 0.75, with `reason` naming the forbidden phrase found or the missing required pattern. Use this when you specifically need to confirm an AI-disclosure marker is present and the two disclaimer phrases are absent — not as a general-purpose safety net; for broader coverage use dcl_evaluate_fast or dcl_evaluate_strict instead.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"response": {
"description": "The agent or LLM response text to check for safety violations.",
"title": "Response",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"response",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_evaluate_safetyArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_evaluate_safety",
"outputSchema": {
"properties": {
"chain_index": {
"description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
"title": "Chain Index",
"type": "integer"
},
"confidence": {
"description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
"title": "Confidence",
"type": "number"
},
"drift_mode": {
"description": "Current drift status: NORMAL, WARNING, ESCALATION, or BLOCK.",
"title": "Drift Mode",
"type": "string"
},
"drift_score": {
"description": "Z-score measuring deviation of the recent commit rate from baseline.",
"title": "Drift Score",
"type": "number"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the evaluated response (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"policy_version": {
"description": "Version of the policy that was applied.",
"title": "Policy Version",
"type": "string"
},
"reason": {
"description": "Human-readable explanation of why the verdict was reached.",
"title": "Reason",
"type": "string"
},
"seal_text": {
"description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
"title": "Seal Text",
"type": "string"
},
"timestamp": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
"title": "Timestamp",
"type": "number"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"verdict": {
"description": "COMMIT if the response passed policy checks, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict",
"type": "string"
},
"verify_url": {
"description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
"title": "Verify Url",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"verdict",
"confidence",
"reason",
"tx_hash",
"chain_index",
"input_hash",
"policy_version",
"drift_mode",
"drift_score",
"timestamp",
"seal_text",
"verify_url"
],
"title": "EvaluateResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "POST-ACTION Secret & Credential Leak Scan ($0.02). Regex-based scan across 8 categories (API keys, cloud credentials, tokens/JWTs, private keys, DB URLs, connection strings, env assignments, webhook secrets, internal endpoints with auth). Any finding results in NO_COMMIT.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"response": {
"description": "The text to scan for exposed API keys, tokens, private keys, DB URLs, and other credentials.",
"title": "Response",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"response",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_evaluate_secretsArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_evaluate_secrets",
"outputSchema": {
"$defs": {
"DetectionFinding": {
"properties": {
"category": {
"description": "Checklist code, e.g. S1-S8 for secrets or T1-T8 for PII.",
"title": "Category",
"type": "string"
},
"position": {
"description": "Character offset of the match in the submitted text.",
"title": "Position",
"type": "integer"
},
"provider": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Identified provider/service, if known.",
"title": "Provider"
},
"redacted_sample": {
"description": "Masked version of the match — first 2 and last 4 chars only.",
"title": "Redacted Sample",
"type": "string"
},
"severity": {
"description": "critical, major, or minor.",
"title": "Severity",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"description": "The specific pattern category matched (e.g. 'api_key', 'email').",
"title": "Type",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"position",
"redacted_sample",
"severity",
"category"
],
"title": "DetectionFinding",
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"categories_checked": {
"description": "All checklist categories that were scanned.",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"title": "Categories Checked",
"type": "array"
},
"categories_clear": {
"description": "Categories with no findings.",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"title": "Categories Clear",
"type": "array"
},
"chain_index": {
"description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
"title": "Chain Index",
"type": "integer"
},
"detection_count": {
"description": "Number of findings.",
"title": "Detection Count",
"type": "integer"
},
"findings": {
"description": "All matches found. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/DetectionFinding"
},
"title": "Findings",
"type": "array"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the scanned text (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"risk_score": {
"description": "0.0-1.0 risk score based on number and severity of findings.",
"title": "Risk Score",
"type": "number"
},
"seal_text": {
"description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
"title": "Seal Text",
"type": "string"
},
"timestamp": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
"title": "Timestamp",
"type": "number"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"verdict": {
"description": "COMMIT if nothing was found, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict",
"type": "string"
},
"verify_url": {
"description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
"title": "Verify Url",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"verdict",
"risk_score",
"findings",
"detection_count",
"categories_checked",
"categories_clear",
"tx_hash",
"chain_index",
"input_hash",
"timestamp",
"seal_text",
"verify_url"
],
"title": "ScanResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "POST-ACTION Market Signal Fabrication Screen ($0.03). Pattern-based heuristic on the output text alone (no source price feed) — flags guaranteed-price-prediction language (\"will definitely hit $X\"), absolute-certainty claims (\"100% certain\", \"cannot go down\"), a fabricated-price flag when a specific dollar figure co-occurs with a guaranteed-outcome claim, and an invented-token flag when a \"$TICKER\" cashtag doesn't match a small set of well-known symbols (false positives are possible for legitimate lesser-known tickers — this is a heuristic pre-check, not ground truth). For a full claim-by-claim check against an actual price-feed snapshot, use the local grounding workflow instead of this live tool. Verdict/confidence collapsing follows the same rule as dcl_evaluate_mev: any critical finding or 2+ major findings is a hard NO_COMMIT; exactly one major finding is a softer NO_COMMIT at ~0.55 confidence.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"response": {
"description": "The market signal, analysis, or price-prediction text to screen.",
"title": "Response",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"response",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_evaluate_signalArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_evaluate_signal",
"outputSchema": {
"$defs": {
"CryptoFinding": {
"properties": {
"regulatory_reference": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Illustrative regulatory tag for this finding type (e.g. MiFID II, FCA), if applicable.",
"title": "Regulatory Reference"
},
"severity": {
"description": "critical or major.",
"title": "Severity",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"description": "The specific pattern category matched.",
"title": "Type",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"severity"
],
"title": "CryptoFinding",
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"chain_index": {
"description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
"title": "Chain Index",
"type": "integer"
},
"confidence": {
"description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
"title": "Confidence",
"type": "number"
},
"findings": {
"description": "All matched patterns. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CryptoFinding"
},
"title": "Findings",
"type": "array"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the screened text (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"reason": {
"description": "Human-readable explanation of the verdict.",
"title": "Reason",
"type": "string"
},
"timestamp": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
"title": "Timestamp",
"type": "number"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"verdict": {
"description": "COMMIT if no fabrication/overconfidence pattern matched, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"verdict",
"confidence",
"reason",
"findings",
"tx_hash",
"chain_index",
"input_hash",
"timestamp"
],
"title": "SignalResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "STRICT Pre-Action Audit ($0.05). Runs the response against a broader, higher-bar \"strict\" policy: the union of all forbidden phrases from the default, anti-jailbreak, and safety policies (8 phrases total), with a 0.85 minimum-confidence threshold instead of the default policy's 0.7. Each matched phrase costs 0.4 confidence; if confidence falls below 0.85, or any phrase matches, the verdict is NO_COMMIT with `reason` listing every match found. Use this instead of dcl_evaluate_fast when the cost of a false COMMIT is high — e.g. before an irreversible or high-stakes agent action — since it catches jailbreak- and safety-adjacent phrasing that the plain default policy would miss.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"response": {
"description": "The agent or LLM response text to audit.",
"title": "Response",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"response",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_evaluate_strictArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_evaluate_strict",
"outputSchema": {
"properties": {
"chain_index": {
"description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
"title": "Chain Index",
"type": "integer"
},
"confidence": {
"description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
"title": "Confidence",
"type": "number"
},
"drift_mode": {
"description": "Current drift status: NORMAL, WARNING, ESCALATION, or BLOCK.",
"title": "Drift Mode",
"type": "string"
},
"drift_score": {
"description": "Z-score measuring deviation of the recent commit rate from baseline.",
"title": "Drift Score",
"type": "number"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the evaluated response (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"policy_version": {
"description": "Version of the policy that was applied.",
"title": "Policy Version",
"type": "string"
},
"reason": {
"description": "Human-readable explanation of why the verdict was reached.",
"title": "Reason",
"type": "string"
},
"seal_text": {
"description": "Human-readable Leibniz Layer verification seal.",
"title": "Seal Text",
"type": "string"
},
"timestamp": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
"title": "Timestamp",
"type": "number"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"verdict": {
"description": "COMMIT if the response passed policy checks, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict",
"type": "string"
},
"verify_url": {
"description": "Public URL to independently verify this seal.",
"title": "Verify Url",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"verdict",
"confidence",
"reason",
"tx_hash",
"chain_index",
"input_hash",
"policy_version",
"drift_mode",
"drift_score",
"timestamp",
"seal_text",
"verify_url"
],
"title": "EvaluateResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "PRE-ACTION Trade Decision Verifier ($0.02). Screens trade-decision language for guaranteed-return claims, zero-risk/\"can't lose\" framing, and unqualified \"buy/sell X now\" directives — any match is NO_COMMIT. If no unsafe language is found, COMMIT additionally requires the word \"risk\" to appear anywhere in the text as a minimum disclosure marker; its absence alone triggers NO_COMMIT with `reason` noting the missing disclosure. Produces an immutable `trade_receipt` (tx_hash/chain_hash/chain_depth) distinct from the top-level audit hash, for downstream systems that specifically need a trade-shaped receipt object.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"response": {
"description": "The trade decision or recommendation text to screen.",
"title": "Response",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"response",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_evaluate_tradeArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_evaluate_trade",
"outputSchema": {
"$defs": {
"CryptoFinding": {
"properties": {
"regulatory_reference": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Illustrative regulatory tag for this finding type (e.g. MiFID II, FCA), if applicable.",
"title": "Regulatory Reference"
},
"severity": {
"description": "critical or major.",
"title": "Severity",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"description": "The specific pattern category matched.",
"title": "Type",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"severity"
],
"title": "CryptoFinding",
"type": "object"
},
"TradeReceipt": {
"properties": {
"chain_depth": {
"description": "This record's position (index) in the chain.",
"title": "Chain Depth",
"type": "integer"
},
"chain_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the previous commit in the append-only chain that this one links to.",
"title": "Chain Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Tamper-evident proof of this specific trade-verification record.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"tx_hash",
"chain_hash",
"chain_depth"
],
"title": "TradeReceipt",
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"confidence": {
"description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
"title": "Confidence",
"type": "number"
},
"findings": {
"description": "All matched patterns. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/CryptoFinding"
},
"title": "Findings",
"type": "array"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the screened text (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"reason": {
"description": "Human-readable explanation of the verdict.",
"title": "Reason",
"type": "string"
},
"timestamp": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
"title": "Timestamp",
"type": "number"
},
"trade_receipt": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/TradeReceipt",
"description": "Immutable receipt for this trade-verification record."
},
"verdict": {
"description": "COMMIT if the trade decision's language passed the screen, otherwise NO_COMMIT.",
"title": "Verdict",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"verdict",
"confidence",
"reason",
"findings",
"trade_receipt",
"input_hash",
"timestamp"
],
"title": "TradeResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "POST-ACTION Wallet Secret Guardian ($0.02). Scans for BIP-39 seed phrases (12 or 24 consecutive wordlist words), raw hex or WIF-format private keys, Ethereum/Bitcoin wallet addresses, and API keys/bearer tokens appearing near wallet/custody/signing terminology. Any finding results in NO_COMMIT — wallet secrets have no safe threshold, unlike other DCL evaluators. Returns a `sanitized_output` with all matches redacted (null if nothing was found) and a masked `redacted_sample` per finding — the real value is never returned or stored server-side.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that produced the response.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"response": {
"description": "The text to scan for seed phrases, private keys, wallet addresses, and wallet-context API credentials.",
"title": "Response",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"response",
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_evaluate_walletArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_evaluate_wallet",
"outputSchema": {
"$defs": {
"WalletFinding": {
"properties": {
"position": {
"description": "Character offset of the match in the submitted text.",
"title": "Position",
"type": "integer"
},
"redacted_sample": {
"description": "Masked version of the match — never the real value.",
"title": "Redacted Sample",
"type": "string"
},
"severity": {
"description": "critical or major.",
"title": "Severity",
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"description": "seed_phrase, private_key, wallet_address, or wallet_api_credential.",
"title": "Type",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"position",
"redacted_sample",
"severity"
],
"title": "WalletFinding",
"type": "object"
}
},
"properties": {
"chain_index": {
"description": "Sequential index of this record in the audit chain.",
"title": "Chain Index",
"type": "integer"
},
"confidence": {
"description": "Confidence score of the verdict, from 0.0 to 1.0.",
"title": "Confidence",
"type": "number"
},
"findings": {
"description": "All matches found. Empty list if verdict is COMMIT.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/WalletFinding"
},
"title": "Findings",
"type": "array"
},
"input_hash": {
"description": "Hash of the scanned text (raw content is never stored).",
"title": "Input Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"policy_version": {
"description": "Version of the wallet-guardian policy that was applied.",
"title": "Policy Version",
"type": "string"
},
"reason": {
"description": "Human-readable explanation of the verdict.",
"title": "Reason",
"type": "string"
},
"risk_score": {
"description": "0.0-1.0 risk score based on number and severity of findings.",
"title": "Risk Score",
"type": "number"
},
"sanitized_output": {
"anyOf": [
{
"type": "string"
},
{
"type": "null"
}
],
"default": null,
"description": "Input text with all matches redacted. Null if verdict is COMMIT.",
"title": "Sanitized Output"
},
"timestamp": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when this record was sealed.",
"title": "Timestamp",
"type": "number"
},
"tx_hash": {
"description": "Hash of this record in the tamper-evident audit chain.",
"title": "Tx Hash",
"type": "string"
},
"verdict": {
"description": "COMMIT if nothing was found, otherwise NO_COMMIT. Wallet secrets have no safe threshold.",
"title": "Verdict",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"verdict",
"confidence",
"reason",
"findings",
"risk_score",
"tx_hash",
"chain_index",
"input_hash",
"policy_version",
"timestamp"
],
"title": "WalletResult",
"type": "object"
}
},
{
"description": "SESSION Management ($0.05). Generates a new `pipeline_id` and returns session metadata (scope, expiry, initial drift_mode) for organizing a series of related checks under one identifier. Note: this call does not currently link the returned pipeline_id to later evaluate_* calls — there is no server-side session state that ties subsequent audits back to it; it is an identifier/timestamp issuer, not an active tracking session. Use this to obtain a shared reference ID for your own client-side grouping of a multi-step audit sequence; do not rely on it to automatically aggregate drift across calls.",
"inputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that owns this session.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"scope": {
"default": "default",
"description": "Scope label for the session.",
"title": "Scope",
"type": "string"
},
"ttl_seconds": {
"default": 3600,
"description": "Session time-to-live, in seconds.",
"title": "Ttl Seconds",
"type": "integer"
}
},
"required": [
"agent_id"
],
"title": "dcl_pipeline_startArguments",
"type": "object"
},
"name": "dcl_pipeline_start",
"outputSchema": {
"properties": {
"agent_id": {
"description": "Identifier of the agent that owns this session.",
"title": "Agent Id",
"type": "string"
},
"drift_mode": {
"description": "Drift status at session start (always NORMAL for a new session).",
"title": "Drift Mode",
"type": "string"
},
"expires_at": {
"description": "Unix timestamp when the session expires.",
"title": "Expires At",
"type": "number"
},
"pipeline_id": {
"description": "Unique identifier for the newly opened pipeline session.",
"title": "Pipeline Id",
"type": "string"
},
"scope": {
"description": "Scope label for the session.",
"title": "Scope",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"pipeline_id",
"agent_id",
"scope",
"expires_at",
"drift_mode"
],
"title": "PipelineStartResult",
"type": "object"
}
}
]
}Verify it yourself
curl -s https://api.teppi.xyz/v1/evidence/sha256:95c07c476c42053ad7b140793d84dea525ab1b57073ed62a14a2d4489802817a | sha256sum